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IN A FEDERAL CASE, IS THE STATE CONSTITUTION
SOMETHING IMPORTANT OR JUST ANOTHER PIECE OF
PAPER?
RANDALL T. SHEPARD*
Many sources feed the current development in state constitutional law, but the federal judiciary is not among them. Contemplating
the role of the federal courts in the enforcement of state constitutional norms prompts recollection of Gandhi's reply when asked
what he thought about western civilization: "That would be a good
idea."'
Only a lull in the federalization of "rights" law has made the
recent development possible. Litigants who found the federal courts
less willing to embrace their claims than the same courts were
during the Warren Court era have taken to heart Justice Brennan's
famous entreaty that state courts should look to their own constitutions for civil rights protection.2 This hunt for a more favorable
forum has been a driving force in the expansion of state constitutional litigation. The laboring oars have thus naturally been held by
state judges, not by law teachers or federal judges.
Part I of this Article discusses the value of state constitutions in
federal civil cases. Part II explains why state constitutional rights
should be respected in federal criminal proceedings. Finally, Part III
explores certified questions as a means by which federal courts can
support the independent value of state constitutions.

* Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Indiana. Princeton University, A.B., 1969; Yale
Law School, J.D., 1972; University of Virginia, LL.M., 1995.
1. E.F. SCHUMACHER, GOOD WORK 62 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that "(e]ach state has power to impose higher standards ... under state law than is required
by the Federal Constitution," and suggesting that Michigan do so).
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I. THE STATE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE WORTH SOMETHING IN
FEDERAL CIVIL CASES

Traditional doctrines of state and local government law, principles of comity and federalism, and the Guarantee Clause all suggest
that state constitutions should be respected by federal courts
deciding civil cases. The opinion that Justice Byron White wrote for
five justices in Missouri v. Jenkins3 lamentably brushed aside all
such considerations.
Jenkins involved a desegregation order in which the U.S. District
Court approved a plan submitted by the Kansas City Metropolitan
School District (KCMSD).4 The plan suggested a novel approach for
maintaining racial balance in a large, inner-city school system: turn
the entire school district into a massive "magnet school" that would
draw in white families from outside the district.' Predictably, this
proposal was a costly one, initially estimated to require additional
operating funds of $143 million, as well as $53 million for capital
improvements.6 Those amounts eventually proved inadequate, and7
the court later added $187 million for additional capital spending.
After concluding that 'even with Court help it would be very
difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the costs of the
entire remedial plan,"'" the district court determined that "the State
and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, and ordered
them to share the cost of the desegregation remedy in that proportion."' The board submitted its need for higher taxes to the voters,
as required by the Missouri Constitution." Notwithstanding that
the improvements in the local schools would be financed by the state
government on a three-to-one basis, the voters refused to sanction
3. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
4. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 54 (8th Cir. 1985) ("In achieving this goal the
victims of unconstitutional segregation will be restored to the position they would have
occupied absent such conduct, while establishing an environment designed to maintain and
attract non-minority enrollment.").
5. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 60 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 40.
7. Id. at 41.
8. Id. at 40 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 112a).
9. Id. at 41.
10. See id. at 38, 40; see also Mo. CONST. art. X, § l1(c) (requiring a two-thirds majority
vote for a tax increase).
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paying their proposed share." The court then "ordered the KCMSD
property tax levy raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed
valuation through the 1991-1992 fiscal year''12 and "imposed a 1.5%
surcharge on the state income tax levied within the KCMSD."' 3
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals generally approved the
district court's approach but required that, in the future, the district
court simply authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax
collection authorities and enjoin the operation of state laws that
might prevent KCMSD from adequately financing the remedy,
instead of setting the property tax rate itself.14 Justice White
characterized the decision of the circuit court by saying: "The Court
of Appeals reasoned that permitting the school board to set the levy
itself would minimize disruption of state laws and processes and
would ensure maximum consideration of the views of state and local
officials."'"
Writing the majority opinion for the Court, Justice White said:
The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax increase. But there was an alternative, the very one
outlined by the Court of Appeals: it could have authorized or
required KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to
fund the desegregation remedy and could have enjoined the
operationof state laws that would have prevented KCMSD from
exercising this power. The difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form. Authorizing and
directing local government institutions to devise and implement
remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but,
to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions
to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves
created the problems. 6
Justice White's embrace of the Court of Appeals' approach for the
declared purpose of protecting the function of state institutions
---casually enjoining the operation of state laws that would interfere
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 38 n.5.
Id. at 41 (citation omitted).
Id. at 41 n.8 (citation omitted).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1299, 1315 (8th Cir. 1988).
Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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with the judicially imposed remedy-is reminiscent of the famous
Vietnam declaration: 'Wehad to destroy the village in order to save
it."17

Justice White later categorized state statutes and constitutional
provisions as things that potentially "hinder the process" of
implementing a remedy. I" That a Justice writing a landmark
decision, laboring over every turn of phrase, would select the word
"hinder" suggests a dismissiveness of the states' constitutions that
belies the professed concern over state and local institutions.
There are several reasons to object to Justice White's denigration
of state constitutions and laws as mere obstacles to federal remedies. Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Kennedy wrote: "Today's
casual embrace of taxation imposed by the unelected, life-tenured
Federal Judiciary disregards fundamental precepts for the democratic control of public institutions."'9 He identified a flaw in the
very foundation of the majority's opinion:
The premise of the Court's analysis, I submit, is infirm. Any
purported distinction between direct imposition of a tax by the
federal court and an order commanding the school district to
impose the tax is but a convenient formalism where the court's
action is predicated on elimination of state-law limitations on
the school district's taxing authority. As the Court describes it,
the local KCMSD possesses plenary taxing powers, which allow
it to impose any tax it chooses if not "hinder[ed]" by the Missouri
Constitution and state statutes.2 °
Disagreeing with the majority's characterization, Justice Kennedy
said, "[1]ocal government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must
derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State
of Missouri."'" He reasoned that because the Missouri Constitution
states that .'[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes ...
may not be
increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter
17. This statement was allegedly made by a U.S. Army officer in Vietnam to Peter Arnett,
a journalist covering the war. Peter Arnett, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PeterArnett (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
18. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57-58.
19. Id. at 58-59.
20. Id. at 63-64 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).

2005]

JUST ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER?

1441

approval as provided by this constitution,"'2 2 KCMSD did not have
the power to impose the tax, regardless of its willingness to do so.
Justice Kennedy was, of course, describing the universal doctrine of
state and local government law that municipalities and special
districts possess only the powers conferred upon them by the state.
At a minimum, a state's organic document should not be lightly
cast aside because a federal judge finds it inconvenient to a
particular remedy. As Justice Kennedy noted: "It cannot be
contended that interdistrict comparability, which was the ultimate
goal of the District Court's orders, is itself a constitutional command. We have long since determined that 'unequal expenditures
between children who happen to reside in different districts' do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."2 3 Kennedy might just as well
have cited Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,24 in which the Court
observed: 'The Fourteenth Amendment does not purport to expand
or even change the scope of Article III,"25 which would be to say here
that the power to fashion a remedy does not exceed the bounds of
the constitutional violation. It does not ask too much to suggest
that, at least when a federal court is deploying its remedial power,
the state constitution should not be subsumed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and ought to be treated as a matter entitled to separate
weight.
Principles of federalism and comity also suggest the need for
better treatment. As the State of Missouri argued in Jenkins:
These so-called "structural injunctions" have permitted federal
courts, by a gradual process of accretion, to extend their powers
at the expense of elected officials. Beginning with the primary
power to declare legislative acts void, the courts have moved
from enjoining officials to cease unconstitutional behavior to
requiring affirmative relief in order to achieve compliance with
the Constitution. Now, building upon the exercise of that last
power, the courts claim the power to order any necessary
funding for its orders by mandating direct taxation. The problem
is not that assumption of one power does not follow logically
22. Id. (quoting Mo. CONST. art. X, § 16) (first and second alterations in original).
23. Id. at 76 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55
(1973)).
24. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
25. Id. at 23.
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from the one before, but that, measured solely by each incremental step, the evolution seems to have no foreseeable stopping
point. If the power to order higher state taxes is not beyond the
reach of the judiciary, what rationally would be?2"
As the State duly noted, this argument echoes Justice Frankfurter's
concern in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: 'The accretion
of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however
slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of
authority."'2 7 Justice Frankfurter was talking about Harry Truman's
dramatic seizure of the steel mills, but the same danger adheres
with regard to "[t]he wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet
constitutional and statutory requirements [that] are confided to
officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government. 2 8
Missouri argued that when a district court imposes its equitable
power on a state government or its officials, the need for judicial
balancing and restraint is particularly strong:
No one questions the power of the federal courts to correct
unconstitutional conditions, Swann [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ.], 402 U.S. [1,] ... 16 [(1971)], even though the
exercise of that power will place obligations on state and local
officials; at the same time, however, the courts must bear in
mind that their role is to end the unconstitutional conditions
without undue interference with state government. "[T]he
federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs, consistent with the Constitution." Milliken [v. Bradley],
433 U.S. [267,] ... 280-81 [(1977)]. And, as this Court has

26. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Jenkins (No. 88-1150) (footnote and internal citation
omitted).
27. Id. at 32 n.36 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Donald L. Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or
Empire?, 6 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 129, 130 (1982) ("That the enlargement of judicial functions
is a qualitative change that has emerged out of many small quantitative changes, one case
at a time, makes it important to stand back and appraise what has transpired and what it
means for the legal system.").
28. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
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recognized, these interests are at their strongest in matters of
state taxation and finances.2"
Missouri further noted that "[ilt has long been settled law that,
where possible, the federal courts should stay their hands in
matters involving state taxation out of 'a scrupulous regard for the
1,30 The state argued
rightful independence of state governments ....
with some justification that "[t]his principle of restraint 'reflect[s]
the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and
state governments that is essential to 'Our Federalism,' particularly
in the area of state taxation."'3 1
Finally, the Guarantee Clause of the Federal Constitution obliges
all three branches of the federal government to support the essential
characteristics of state governments. The clause declares: "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
" The judiciary has frequently
Republican Form of Government ....
been reluctant to treat Guarantee Clause claims as justiciable,
although in Baker v. Carr,33 the Court reiterated that 'the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to choose
their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their
own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative
bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people
themselves ....
Although the Court has trotted out the Guarantee Clause on only
a few such occasions, some members have held a more fulsome view
of the judiciary's obligations. Justice Douglas wrote:
The right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government.... The statements in [Luther v. Borden] ...that this
29. Brief for Petitioner at 39-40, Jenkins (No. 88-1150).
30. Id. at 40 n.45 (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932)) (alteration in
original).
31. Id. (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Taxation v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103
(1981)) (second alteration in original).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34. Id. at 223 n.48 (quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)). Based on this
interpretation, an amicus curiae in Jenkins argued that the "right of the people to be taxed
in accordance with the laws made by their representatives has been completely subjugated
by the district court" in violation of the Guarantee Clause. Brief of Amicus Curiae New Mexico
at 10-11, Jenkins (No. 88-1150).
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guaranty is enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive
is not maintainable. Of course the Chief Executive, not the
Court, determines how a State will be protected against invasion. Of course each House of Congress, not the Court, is 'the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own
members.'... But the abdication of all judicial functions respecting voting rights ... indeed is contrary to ...
the ... full panoply of
judicial protection to voting rights ....
The Court's refusal to
examine the legality of the regime of martial law which had been
laid upon Rhode Island is indefensible.35
Justice Hugo Black wrote: "[I]t seems to me that [a law] which gives
federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like is in direct
conflict with the clear command of our Constitution that 'The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.""'3 Judge John Minor Wisdom
likewise noted:
The question in this case is whether the constitutional amendment was adopted in an unrepublican manner; more specifically,
whether the ballot was so misleading that the people were
deprived of one of the fundamental rights inherent in a republican government, the right to vote on an amendment to their
constitution. The same standards "judicially manageable" in
determining whether the plaintiffs were deprived of due process
would seem to be applicable in determining whether they were
deprived of the protection of a republican government. I regard
the issue here, therefore, as justiciable under the Guaranty
Clause. On the merits, however, and for the same reasons the
due process clause was not offended, I would hold that the
process by which Amendment 26 to the Louisiana Constitution
was adopted does not offend Article IV, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution.
The line of judicial development of the republican guarantee,
bent and broken since [Luther v. Borden], is not beyond repair.
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 243 n.2 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Kohler
v.Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 984-85 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 531 (1969).
36. Brief of Amicus Curiae New Mexico at 12, Jenkins (No. 88-1150) (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 359 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (footnote omitted)).
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Some day, in certain circumstances, the judicial branch may be
the most appropriate branch of government to enforce the
Guaranty Clause. Federal courts should be loath to read out of
the Constitution as judicially nonenforceable a provision that
the Founding Fathers considered essential to formulation of a
workable federalism.37
One need accord these views only plausible weight in order to
conclude that the Guarantee Clause should be reexamined as a
protection of state autonomy and law in federal litigation.
Notwithstanding the views Justice White offered in Missouri v.
Jenkins, traditional state and local government law doctrine,
principles of comity and federalism, and the Guarantee Clause all
mandate that more respect be given to state constitutions in federal
civil cases.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SHOULD MATTER IN
CRIMINAL LAW

The nearly universal conclusion of federal courts is that violations
of a defendant's state constitutional rights are irrelevant if the
defendant is charged in a federal forum. For example, evidence
seized in violation of the state constitution is routinely admitted in
federal cases, even when the evidence was initially seized by state
officers." The first section of this Part will discuss the history of
passing such evidence back and forth between state and federal
officers (under the so-called "silver platter" doctrine), and the
reasons the U.S. Supreme Court eventually condemned the practice.
The second section will discuss the current role of state search and
seizure rights in federal cases and argue that the same policy
considerations that led the Supreme Court to prohibit the introduc37. Kohler, 292 F. Supp. at 985 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Delaporte, 42 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 1994):
[I] f Indiana wants to prevent even the rather technical violations of its telephone
warrant statute that occurred here, it can punish its law enforcement officers
who turn over evidence seized under unlawful warrants to the federal
government. If it does not want to do this, that is no concern of ours.
Id. at 1120; United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We
therefore reject the suggestion ... that federal courts should defer to state law in deciding
whether to admit evidence seized by state officers, ... and reaffirm ... that evidence seized in
compliance with federal law is admissible without regard to state law.").
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tion into state court of evidence seized by federal officers in violation
of federal law militates against the admission in federal courts of
evidence seized by state officers in violation of state law.
A. History of the Silver PlatterDoctrine
More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court laid the
foundation for the exclusionary rule when it held that "any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of [a] crime ... is within
the condemnation [of the Constitution] ."" Although it took nearly
thirty years, this led to Weeks v. United States,4" which required
federal courts to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court said that sanctioning the retention and
evidentiary use of illegally seized evidence "would be to affirm by
judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action."'" The stout-hearted
declaration of principle in Weeks came coupled with an observation
that turned out to be a considerable loophole. The Court held that
evidence obtained by state officials in violation of the Federal
Constitution need not be excluded from federal court: "As to the
papers and property seized by the policemen, it does not appear that
they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as would make
the Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures."42 This
ruling allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence seized by state
officers in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the principle
established in it became known as the "silver platter" doctrine.4 3
True to its doctrinal moniker, it became the habit of state officers to
hand over evidence to federal authorities.
Various versions of this loophole proved very popular with law
enforcement and the Court began backing away from it. In Rea v.
United States,4 4 the defendant sought to enjoin a federal officer who
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 398.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
350 U.S. 214 (1956).

2005]

JUST ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER?

1447

planned to testify in a state prosecution based upon evidence seized
under an illegal federal warrant. 45 The Court refused to address the
constitutional arguments advanced by the parties and instead based
its holding on the federal courts' supervisory powers over federal
law enforcement agencies. 46 The Court enjoined the federal officer
from testifying in state court, and held that the federal rules "are
designed to protect the privacy of the citizen, unless the strict
standards set for searches and seizures are satisfied. That policy is
defeated if the federal agent can flout them and use the fruits of his
unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings. '47 This decision
effectively prevented evidence seized by federal officers in violation
of the Federal Constitution from being admitted in state court.
In Elkins v. United States,45 the Court addressed the silver platter
doctrine directly and concluded that it could no longer be accepted.49
The Court held that to prevent the frustration of both state and
federal policies, avoid needless conflict between state and federal
courts, and protect judicial integrity, federal courts should deny
admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence whether the search
was conducted by federal or local authorities."
Just one year after Elkins, the Supreme Court held in Mapp v.
Ohio,"1 that the Fourteenth Amendment compelled the states to use
the exclusionary rule, rendering evidence obtained in violation of
the Federal Constitution inadmissible in both federal and state
courts.5 2 The Court noted that "the striking outcome of the Weeks
case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that
the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the
use of evidence in court, really forbade its introduction if obtained
by government officers through a violation of the Amendment.""
This march of cases deploying the exclusionary rule had been the
45. Id. at 215-16. The defendant had previously been indicted on federal charges, but the
district court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the indictment. Id.
46. Id. at 216-17.
47. Id. at 218.
48. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
49. Id. at 208.
50. Id. at 221-24.
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. Id. at 655.
53. Id. at 649 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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target of criticism from nearly the beginning, and the Mapp Court
recognized this fact. Benjamin Cardozo famously opined that under
the exclusionary rule "[tihe criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered."54 The Court rejected this characterization,
however, stating that "the criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.""5 The Court further
stated that the rule "gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than
that which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of
justice." 6
To elucidate the new rule, the Court explained that "the purpose
of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it."' 7 Extending the
exclusionary rule to the states, the Court noted: "The ignoble
shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest.""
Whether this ignoble shortcut is still available now seems to
depend on whose officers need deterring. There are a number of
permutations, some matters of settled law and others not, including:
(1) Whether evidence gathered by state officials which is
inadmissible in that state's courts is admissible in federal court
("new silver platter"). (2) Whether evidence gathered by federal
officials, which would be inadmissible in state courts if state
officials had gathered the evidence, is admissible in state courts
("reverse silver platter"). (3) Whether evidence gathered by
54. Id. at 659 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,587 (N.Y. 1926)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Cardozo was not alone in this. In the 1920s, Professor Wigmore wrote of the
development of the exclusionary rule: "the heretical influence of [Weeks v. United States]
spread, and evoked a contagion of sentimentality in some of the State Courts, inducing them
to break loose from long-settled fundamentals." 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (2d ed. 1923).
55. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
56. Id. at 660.
57. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
58. Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
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officials in state A, which is inadmissible in state A's courts, is
admissible in state B['s courts] ("interstate silver platter").59
These questions present some of the same challenges and policy
concerns, such as deterring police misconduct and forum shopping,
as the original silver platter doctrine, but cannot be resolved simply
by invoking the Supremacy Clause, as federal courts commonly do.
B. State Rights in Federal Courts
Federal courts have consistently held that evidence is admissible
in federal courts even if seized by local authorities in violation of
state law. United States v. Singer"° is a signature case for this
proposition. In Singer, Milwaukee County sheriffs, carrying a search
warrant that included a no-knock provision, entered Singer's
residence unannounced and seized weapons, drug paraphernalia,
and 3.2 kilograms of methamphetamines." This evidence found its
way to the U.S. Attorney, who procured an indictment in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin." Singer sought
to suppress the evidence, arguing that the sheriffs violated his
rights under the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions when they failed
to knock and announce their purpose before entering his home.'
The Seventh Circuit, calling Wisconsin law "irrelevant," 4 held that
evidence seized by local authorities was admissible in federal
proceedings if it was obtained in a manner consistent with the U.S.
Constitution and federal law. The panel held:
As we have noted before, federal standards control the admissibility of evidence in a federal prosecution even though the
evidence was seized by state officials and would not be admissi59. Tom Quigley, Comment, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in State-FederalRelations?
Using Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions,20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 285, 314-15
(1988).
60. 943 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 759-60. Based on testimony that Singer was distributing large quantities of
drugs and possessed handguns, the judge granted the no-knock provision to better ensure the
safety of the officers and to prevent Singer from destroying evidence of his illegal activities.

Id.
62. See id. at 761.
63. See id. at 760.
64. Id. at 763 n.8 ("Although Wisconsin law is irrelevant to our decision .....
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ble in state court. Whether the evidence in the case was seized
in contravention of the constitution or laws of the state of
Wisconsin does not control its admissibility in federal criminal
proceedings; and accordingly, the officers' compliance or lack of
compliance with Wisconsin law (as set forth in Cleveland) is
irrelevant. Rather, the proper standard for federal application
provides that evidence seized by state law enforcement officers
is admissible in a federal criminal proceeding if it is obtained in
a manner consistent with the protections afforded by the United
States Constitution and federal law.65

More recently, in United States v. Wilson, 6 a panel of the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that although "states retain a great deal of
flexibility in the manner in which they conform their law enforcement procedures to the standards of the Fourth Amendment,"
federal standards alone determine whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.6 7 Wilson cites several Seventh
Circuit opinions, as well as opinions from nearly every other federal
circuit, that support the notion that federal courts should apply only
federal law despite the existence of potential state law violations.6 6
65. Id. at 761 (citing United States v. D'Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1218 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 907 (7th Cir. 1988)).
66. 169 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 423.
68. Virtually every federal circuit has addressed and confirmed that federal law governs
federal criminal proceedings, despite state law:
[T]he First Circuit held that evidence admissible under federal law is admissible
in federal court proceedings without regard to state law, even when the evidence
is obtained in the course of a state investigation. The Second Circuit has held
that evidence that is admissible under federal law will not be suppressed during
a federal trial on the basis of a violation of a state exclusionary rule. See United
States v. Pforzheimer,826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, in United
States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit held that
evidence obtained in accordance with federal law is admissible in federal court
even if the evidence was obtained by state officers in violation of state law. The
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Clutchette, 24 F.3d 577 (4th Cir. 1994),
declined to address the question of interplay between state law and the
exclusionary rule. However, the court stated that the prevailing view appears
to be that violations of state law alone do not compel exclusion of the evidence
in federal courts. See id. at 581. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Eastland,
989 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 510 U.S. 890 ... (1993), held that
when evidence is secured by state officials and is to be used against a defendant
in a federal prosecution, admissibility of the evidence is determined by federal
law.
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Although state law may play an ancillary role even in Fourth
Amendment reasonableness determinations,6 9 this role is rarely
acknowledged. Typically, in response to a defendant's motion to
suppress, the federal tribunal simply says that the legality of an
arrest under the Fourth Amendment "does not turn on state law,""v
or that "[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is
a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment ...[that]
requires no additional justification,"" and disregards state law. 2
Of course, state officers carry out most law enforcement, most
arrests, and most prosecutions in the country. Allowing illegally
seized evidence to be passed over for use in federal court is the
"ignoble shortcut" condemned in Mapp and "tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest."7 3 As the Supreme Court noted in Weeks v. United
States:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. 4
Similarly, if rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant by a state's
constitution may be disregarded by admitting evidence seized in
violation of those rights in federal court, the rights have little value
Id. at 765. The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that evidence obtained in violation of state
law is admissible in a federal criminal trial if the evidence was obtained without violating the
Constitution or federal law. See United States v. Padilla-Pena,129 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 906 (1998); Wilson, 169 F.3d at 424 n.5. Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit in Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994), held that "in determining
whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a federal court
must only look to federal law." Id. at 301 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 22324 (1960)).
69. See supra note 68.
70. United States v. Ames, No. TH02-010-CR-01-T/L, 2003 WL 1903373, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 27, 2003).
71. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72. See id. at *8.
73. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
74. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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and may as well be stricken from the state constitution. Moreover,
as the Supreme Court said in Mapp, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter unlawful law enforcement conduct 75 and the federal
judiciary should not provide state officers with an incentive to
disregard state law. Even though a federal court has the power to
Clause, that does not
admit this evidence under the Supremacy
76
mean the federal court should do so.
Evidence seized by state actors in violation of state statutory or
constitutional law should be presumptively inadmissible. Rejecting
the silver platter doctrine created appropriate distinctions for officer
misconduct and helped increase accountability among law enforcement officials. Disallowing these new silver platters would advance
the same goals and safeguard state-guaranteed rights.

III. RESPECTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS THROUGH THE USE OF
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

When attempting to determine uncertain state substantive law,
federal judges are faced with three basic options: predicting
unsettled state law; declining supplemental jurisdiction over cases
involving novel or complex state law;" or certifying a question to the
state's supreme court for clarification." Certified questions allow
federal courts to resolve all of the issues relevant to the dispute
while showing respect for the independence of state law and the
state supreme court as the final arbiter of that law.

75. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
76. The appropriate state and federal roles might be illustrated if one re-staged the events
of Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), with the roles reversed. The Court in Rea
reversed the decision of a federal court judge not to enjoin a federal officer from testifying in,
or transferring illegally seized evidence to, a state court after that testimony and evidence
was suppressed in federal court. The state court might enjoin the state officer from supplying
testimony to sponsor illegally gained evidence.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2000). This may not always be practical. For example, in the
recent case Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003), the issue of state law was a
conflict of laws question and was a threshold issue in the case. Id. at 194. The Third Circuit
was faced with either predicting unsettled state law or certifying a question to the Supreme
Court of Indiana. See id. at 195. The Third Circuit chose to certify the question, and the state
supreme court resolved the issue, in Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2004), so
the case was able to proceed.
78. See, e.g., IND. APP. R. 64.
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In a recent survey, federal judges cited to the following benefits
of certification:
"orderly development of law, particularly in diversity cases;"
"result produced is a reliable and controlling precedent;"
"avoidance of needless conflicts on state law;" "comity;" "allows
for judicial economy and cost saving measures to the litigants;"
"will usually help other state or federal courts with similar case
issues;" "uniformity of results and justice;" "reducing risks of
different outcomes depending on forum choice, reducing forum
shopping, quicker resolution by state court of last resort of
issues affecting many pending decisions in both state and federal
courts;" "can avoid useless wheel-spinning;" and "avoiding
conflicts between different panels in the same circuit."7
Most notably for present purposes, a certified question insures that
the state supreme court decides important and often novel issues of
state constitutional law"° and respects the independence of the state
law. All but five states now have a valid certification process in
place.8
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,82 the Supreme Court
chastised the Ninth Circuit for avoiding an opportunity to certify a
question to the Arizona Supreme Court. Justice Ginsburg stated
that the certification process "allows a federal court faced with a
novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's
highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing
the assurance of gaining an authoritative response." 3
Unfortunately, although the process is now well established,
there are certain impediments to successful certification of state-law
79. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE
53 (1995).
80. See Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, InteractiveJudicialFederalism:Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 373 (2000) (observing that "New York's
certification law ... enables [other courts] to send unsettled questions of New York law to the
state Court of Appeals for authoritative resolution, thereby eliminating the need for those
courts to speculate over the content of New York law necessary to resolve a pending case").
81. Alabama, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont have no certification procedures.
See id. at 373 n.1. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that Missouri's statutory
certification process violates the state constitution. See Grantham v. Mo. Dep't of Corrections,
No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13, 1990).
82. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
83. Id. at 76.
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questions. In a recent examination, federal judges acknowledged
delay, inadequate factual records, incomplete answers, and overreaching answers as problem areas.' State justices identified
insufficient factual records, inadequate briefing or oral arguments,
unresolved factual disputes, answering abstract and isolated issues,
unclear or poorly formed questions, and a tendency to certify
questions which, even if unresolved, have little impact on the
outcome of the case.8
The most significant of these problems is a direct result of the
procedural posture of a certified question. First, the phrasing of the
question itself can make the court's legal analysis more difficult and
the resulting reply less useful. Re-forming the question sometimes
makes the state court's task more manageable by permitting it to
frame legal issues in terms of its own jurisprudence, but it may not
assist the federal court in resolving the controversy before it.
Second, when a certified question squarely places a constitutional
issue before the state supreme court, the standard legal progression
of resolving issues is bypassed. Whereas normally a court will
address constitutional issues only when necessary, a court receiving
a constitutional issue as a certified question may decide the issue
unaware that it is not necessary to the outcome. In addition,
because the court is deciding the issue in isolation, there is a higher
risk that it may determine a particular statute to be unconstitutional on its face when, in truth, it is only unconstitutional as
applied.
Finally, the court's receipt of the question without a fully
developed factual record raises further problems.8 Without a fully
developed record, the precedential value of an opinion regarding a
previously unsettled point of constitutional law becomes uncertain.
Future litigants may rely on the holding to bolster their position,
but without the nuanced analysis typical of a mixed question of
fact and law, it is difficult for courts to ascertain the appropriateness of such reliance. Deciding a pure question of law is a somewhat unusual event, and constitutional issues are especially factsensitive, requiring a litigant to argue the facts as much as the law.

84. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 79, at 54-55.
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id.
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Consequently, an opinion stripped of the intricacies of the facts
relevant to the issue has less utility for future litigants. 7
Despite these problems, certified questions remain the best and
most efficient way for a federal court to resolve an unsettled issue
of state law arising in one of its cases while demonstrating respect
for the state and its law.
CONCLUSION

A central theme in the recent jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court has been reinvigoration of the notion of the United States as
a federal nation. The powers retained by states, legislators, and
governors have recently been accorded more care than was the case
some decades ago. Greater care for the state constitutions, and for
the decisions state courts make about them, would build better
comity between state and federal courts and otherwise serve the
country well.

87. I have recently explored some of these issues. See Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State
ConstitutionalLaw Through Certified Questions a Good Idea or a Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L.
REV. 327 (2004).

